Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 13
Issue 1 Winter 1980

Article 11

1980

Book Review
Roy E. Thoman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Roy E. Thoman, Book Review, 13 Vanderbilt Law Review 239 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol13/iss1/11

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

BOOK REVIEW
THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION. Lee C.
Buchheit. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978. Pp. xi, 260.
$17.50. Reviewed by Roy E. Thoman.*
SECESSION:

Making use of historical accounts, and principles of international law and politics, Lee C. Buchheit examines one of the most
intractable and perplexing problems of this era: self-determination, The author is a cum laude graduate of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, where he served as editor of the law
review. The recipient of a fellowship to study public international
law, Buchheit received a diploma in international law from Cambridge University in 1976. The focus of his book is on the implications for the world community of appeals to the principle of selfdetermination by secessionist elements within independent states.
An effort is made to explore the status within international law of
claims to secessionist self-determination and to suggest considerations that might influence a collective international decision regarding the legitimacy of these claims.
The first chapter includes a discussion of historical origins of
the problem. Although the concept of self-determination was not
entirely neglected in earlier times, it became a very prominent
issue during the period of the First World War. Associated with
President Woodrow Wilson, the doctrine embraced the principle
that the only legitimate form of government was self-government
by natural political units, "wiih its corollary that multinational
States or empires, the products of conquest or dynastic union,
were ultimately illegitimate political entities." Legitimacy was
seen to derive from the consent of the people, buttressed by the
realization that government without consent meant an internal
disorder that would ultimately threaten international peace.
The author suggests, however, that the doctrine of self-determination incorporated a "lethal weakness," in that it assumed that
"nations" would generally be self-evident entities, "and that only
* Professor of Political Science, West Texas State University. B.A., 1960, University of Evansville; M.A., 1964, Indiana University; Ph.D., 1967, University of
Kentucky.
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nations, as history had delimited them, would constitute natural
political units having a compelling desire for self-government."
The seeds of confusion planted by this weakness did not take
long to ripen.
Even before the process of "national" self-determination as undertaken at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 could be implemented in a satisfactory manner, distinct ethnic groups, such as
the Kurds.

.

.began to invoke the international norm of self-gov-

ernment as a justification for independence from, or at least regional autonomy within, their governing States. The polyethnic
States were . . . subjected to the same attack as multinational

empires.
Some observers feared that the international community had
created a Frankensteinian monster. A grave dilemma thus
presented itself: In view of the fact that self-determination had
achieved legal legitimacy, how could the international community
prevent the almost infinite fragmentation of existing states by innumerable minority groups demanding the right of secession?
From the standpoint of legal theory, this question has never been
satisfactorily answered. The question was temporarily eclipsed as
the principle of self-determination was enlisted to justify the
decolonization movement after World War II. As the process of
decolonization was accomplished, however, the old problem resurfaced as secessionist groups within sovereign entities again attempted to legitimize their claims through the principle of selfdetermination.
Buchheit discusses an interesting ideological bias reflected in
the position taken by the leaders of many ex-colonial, Third
World, and Communist states. The United Nations, where these
countries have a majority in the General Assembly, has been vociferous in its condemnation of the continuance of any vestiges of
traditional colonialism. There has not, however, been any similar
enthusiasm for the right of oppressed minorities to secede from
states.
One searches in vain ... for any principled justification of

why a colonial people wishing to cast off the domination of its governors has every moral and legal right to do so, but a manifestly
distinguishable minority which happens to find itself, pursuant to a
paragraph in some medieval territorial settlement or through a fiat
of the cartographers, annexed to an independent State must forever remain without the scope of the principle of self-determination.
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Chapter Three presents a summary of six case studies involving
secessional disputes. Included, among others, are studies of the
Kurds, Biafra, and Bangla Desh. Of the cases surveyed, Bangla
Desh provides the only example of a successful secession.
The concluding chapter, "The Standards of Legitimacy," is the
most important and original part of the work. The author points
out that existing theoretical and legal gaps can lead to situations
that endanger international peace and stability. He observes that
the international community, by its current inability to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate secession, is severely handicapped in attempts to curb unwarranted third-party intervention
in these conflicts. And "the danger of unrestrained intervention
inevitably brings in its wake a possibility of escalation and the
confrontation of major power blocs." One is left with the melancholy fact that situations involving a potentially serious threat to
international peace "remain . . . unfettered by any specific doctrines of international law."
The author develops his own' theory of legitimate, secessionist
self-determination on the basis of what could be termed pragmatic moderation. He recognizes the secessionist self-determination principle, and yet seeks to minimize threats to international
peace and security. He attempts to accomplish this by focusing on
criteria for determining legitimate claims. On a case by case basis,
this involves "an inquiry into the nature of the group, its situation within its governing State, its prospects for an independent
existence, and the effect of its separation on the remaining population and the world community in general." Such considerations
could lead to the development of standards by which the international community could determine instances of legitimate claims
to secessionist self-determination.
The benefits of this approach could be significant. "These standards, whether specifically incorporated into the jurisprudence of
an organization like the United Nations . . ., or whether remaining part of general international law, would constitute a basis for
criticizing, and thus regulating, the conduct of outside States in a
secessionist conflict."
Buchheit's theoretical approach for determining legitimacy involves balancing what he terms the "internal merits of the claim"
against elements contributing to the "disruption factor." The relationship between these two factors is represented in the form
of a graph in the book's appendix. In a situation where the disruption factor appears to be high, a group's claim to secession
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would have to be supported by very strong evidence. Where the
disruption factor seems to be low, standards of group selfhood
would not have to be as strict. The author hastens to point out
that his approach is not intended to be scientifically quantifiable,
but is, rather, "a term of art."
The author concludes that it is both possible and desirable for
the international community to adopt an explicit and objective
statement of guidelines concerning secessionist questions. As a
potential model for such an endeavor, he cites the General Assembly's 1970 Declarationon Friendly Relations.
Without question, States will continue to be importuned by separatist movements with or without a rational scheme for determining the legitimacy of these claims. By publishing such a scheme,
the world community might hope to impose a reasoned, predictable
order upon so dangerous an area of societal and international discord. It is suggested, moreover, that it is in the enlightened selfinterest of individual States to further this effort. Surely it is wiser,
and in the end safer, to raise secessionist claims above the present
"force of arms" test and into a sphere in which rational discussion
can illuminate the legitimate interests of all concerned.
This is an excellent book and an important contribution to the
literature of international law. The author has creatively proposed a solution to an international problem that has, over the
years, resulted in immeasurable loss of life and property.

